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NOTEl

First Amendment Public Forum Analysis:
Restrictions on the Right to Receive
Information Upheld in Kreimer v. Bureau

of Police
In Kreimer v. Bureau of Police for the Town of Morristown,'
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed a
district court's decision which held unconstitutional a set of regulations pertaining to patron conduct in a public library that had closed
its doors to a homeless man.2 In rejecting the district court's standard of review, the court of appeals delved further into controversial
public forum analysis3 in an attempt to balance an individual's First
Amendment right to receive information 4 with the government's in1. 958 F.2d 1242 (3d Cir. 1992).
2. Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 765 F.2d 181 (D.N.J. 1991), rev'd, 958 F.2d 1242 (3d
Cir. 1992).
3. The controversy stems from what some scholars consider irrelevant and haphazard
application of public forum analysis in First Amendment cases. See Daniel A. Farber & John
E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First
Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219, 1234 (1984) (contending that public forum
analysis diverts attention from real First Amendment issues); see also Peter Jakab, Note, Public Forum Analysis After Perry Education v. Perry Local Educators' Association-A Conceptual Approach to Claims of First Amendment Access to Publicly Owned Property, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 551 (1986) (contending that analysis leaves lower courts without a
conceptual method for categorizing public property).
4. For a detailed description of the evolution of the right to receive information, see
generally Eric G. Olsen, Note, The Right to Know in First Amendment Analysis, 57 TEx L.
REV. 505 (1979). For decisions on this matter, see Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141
(1943) (holding that the First Amendment includes the right to receive, information as well as
the freedom to speak); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (holding statute
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terest in providing a proper atmosphere within a public library.5 By
classifying a public library as a limited public forum, the court of
appeals extended the government's ability to restrict an individual's
First Amendment rights. 6 In attempting to strengthen the structure
of public forum analysis by further delineating the categories of public places, the Kreimer decision ironically demonstrates that public
forum analysis has lost some if its usefulness in dealing with First
Amendment issues.
The Joint Free Public Library of Morristown and Morris Township 7 established a patron policy that prohibited certain behavior
within the library. 8 Richard R. Kreimer, whose frequent and disruptive presence originally alerted the library staff to the need for such
a policy, is a homeless man who lives in public places within the
town.9 Kreimer's conduct, cataloged over a seven-month period, included such behavior as staring at a librarian for two ninety-minute
periods, exuding an offensive odor, acting with hostility towards the
library director and following a patron who had left the library.10
This activity led to his expulsion on two occasions after the rules
were implemented. Seeking to have the regulations held unconstitutional, Kreimer consulted the ACLU and filed a pro se complaint,
alleging, in part, that the rules were facially invalid under the First
Amendment's right to receive information.12 The defendant sought
summary judgment on the facial validity of the rules and a
mandatory injunction requiring Kreimer to exit the library upon
command. 13
requiring Postmaster General to deliver mail containing communist propaganda only upon addressee's written request unconstitutional as a limitation on the exercise of the addressee's
right to receive information); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (holding First Amendment right to receive information includes right to private possession of obscene materials).
5. Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1246.
6. Id.
7. The statutory language creating the library states that "[a]ny two or more municipalities may unite in the support, maintenance and control of a joint free library for the use and
benefit of the residents of such municipalities." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:54-29.3 (West 1991).
8. Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1247.
9. Id. at 1247.
10. Id.
I1. Id.
12. Kreimer also sought to have the regulations abolished as violations of the overbreadth doctrine, the vagueness doctrine of the First Amendment, and the New Jersey Constitution. As these arguments are not pertinent to public forum analysis, they will not be discussed in this note.
13. Kreimer, 765 F. Supp. at 183. In his cross-motion for summary judgment, Kreimer
requested that the court enter a declaratory judgment holding that the library's patron policy
violated his rights under the New Jersey and United States Constitutions; an injunction barring the enforcement of Rules 1, 5, 9, and the unnumbered paragraphs; and finally, an injunction prohibiting the recurrence of any such policies designed to bar homeless people. Id.

PUBLIC FORUM ANALYSIS

The district court sided with Kreimer and held that certain
paragraphs of the regulations were "null and void on their face and
unenforceable." 1" The district court properly held that the patron
policy, which governs access to reading materials, implicated
Kreimer's right to receive information, a penumbral First Amendment right. 15 In evaluating the restriction of this right, however, the
district court improperly applied the public forum analysis. 16 In classifying the library as a traditional public forum, similar to a park or
street, the district court used the strictest standard of review. Under7
this standard the regulations failed to pass constitutional muster.'
The court of appeals, however, held that the library was a limited
public forum which called for a two-tier standard of review,' 8 and,
consequently, the court of appeals found the regulations
constitutional.' 9
14. Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1250. The regulations are as follows:
1. Patrons shall be engaged in activities associated with the use of a public library while in the building. Patrons not engaged in reading, studying, or using
library materials shall be required to leave the building.
5. Patrons shall respect the rights of other patrons and shall not harass or annoy
others through noisy or boisterous activities, by staring at another person with
the intent to annoy that person, by following another person about the building
with the intent to annoy that person, by playing audio equipment so that others
can hear it, by singing or talking to others or in monologues, or by behaving in a
manner which reasonably can be expected to disturb other persons.
9. Patrons shall not be permitted to enter the building without a shirt or other
covering of their upper bodies or without shoes or other footwear. Patrons whose
bodily hygiene is offensive so as to constitute a nuisance to other persons shall be
required to leave the building.
Any patron not abiding by these or other rules and regulations of the library
shall be asked to leave the library premises. Library employees shall contact the
Morristown Police if deemed advisable.
Any patron who violates the Library rules and regulations shall be denied the
privilege of access to the Library by the Library Board of Trustees, on recommendation of the Library Director. Any patron whose privileges have been denied, may have the decision reviewed by the Board of Trustees.
Id. at 1248.
15. Id. at 1251. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (holding that it is well
established that the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas). See also
supra note 4 and accompanying text.
16. Public forum analysis is used to determine the level of restriction the government
may enforce. In Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983), the
Court held that the character of the property determines the limits government may impose.
In breaking public property into three categories the Court hoped to simplify the analysis. See
also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 796 (1985) ("[T]he
extent to which the Government may limit access depends on whether the forum is public or
nonpublic.").
17. Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 765 F. Supp. 181, 187 (D.N.J. 1991), rev'd, 958 F.2d
1242 (3d Cir. 1992).
18. Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242, 1259 (3d Cir. 1992).
19. Id.at 1261.
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It has always been accepted that the government can place certain time, place and manner restrictions on an individual's First
Amendment rights in order to balance community interests.2 0 For
example, restrictions can make it illegal to drive a sound truck
through a neighborhood in the middle of the night.2 1 What has been
extensively questioned, though, is the degree of restriction the government may impose.22 In an effort to develop a more systematic
approach, courts began looking at the nature of the public property
to determine the justifiable level of regulation. This concept was first
developed in Hague v. C.LO.,23 where the United States Supreme
Court stated that streets and parks have from time immemorial been
a part of the rights and liberties of citizens. This marked an aboutface change from the Court's holding in Davis v. Massachusetts"
that a flat ban on speech in the Boston Commons would be acceptable.25 Courts continued to develop the public forum methodology
which was eventually pulled together in Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educators' Ass'n. 6 Perry revealed that First Amendment
analysis had developed into a type of "geographic"12 7 approach, with
three individual categories of forums.
The traditional public forum has existed time out of mind as a
place for communicative ideas, and any government imposed restriction is subject to a very strict examination.2 8 Courts have required
restrictions to satisfy a four-part test.2 9 They must be narrowly tailored, serve a compelling governmental interest, leave open ample
alternative channels of communication, and be content neutral.3"
Restrictionson a designated public forum, a place established
by a state for public expression such as a public university, require
the same strict scrutiny as restrictions on a traditional public fo20. R. Allan Horning, The First Amendment Right to a Public Forum, 1969 DUKE L.J.
931, 947 (1969).
21. Horning, supra note 20 at 947.
22. See generally, Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SuP. CT. REV. 1.
23. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
24. 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
25. Jakab, supra note 3, at 547.
26. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
27. Farber & Nowak, supra note 3, at 1220.
28. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
(observing that the rights of government to limit expression in a traditional public forum are
sharply circumscribed).
29. Id.
30. Id. See Elisabeth A. Langworthy, Note, Time, Place or Manner Restrictions on
Commercial Speech, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 127, 130 (1983).

PUBLIC FORUM ANALYSIS

rum. 31 While a state need not permanently keep the forum accessible
to the public, it is bound by the same four-part test as long as it does
maintain the forum. 2 In contrast, a nonpublic forum is public property that does not have communication or expression as its main purpose, such as an army base.33 The regulation of a non-public forum
need only pass a reasonableness test. 34 Notably, since the time of
Perry, no restrictions concerning a nonpublic forum have been found
unreasonable.3"
Since Perry, courts have created a sub-category to the designated public forum in order to better target the analysis. 36 This newest classification, termed a limited public forum, "is created when
government opens a nonpublic forum but limits the expressive activity to certain kinds of speakers or to the discussion of certain subjects. ' ' 37 If the speech being regulated is the type of expression for
which the forum was created, then the same strict .test. from the
traditional and designated forums will be applied. However, if the
which the forum was created,
speech is not the type of expression for
38
then the reasonableness test is used.
In applying the Perry analysis, the court of appeals in Kreimer
rejected the district court's conclusion that a public library was a
traditional public forum. The court of appeals stated that a "patron
cannot be permitted to engage in most traditional First Amendment
activities in the library, such as giving speeches or engaging in any
other conduct that would disrupt the quiet and peaceful library environment."3 9 The court then reviewed the characteristics of a designated forum and the latest analytical developments since Perry,4
both of which suggest that the governmental intent in opening the
forum is of the greatest importance in determining the nature of the
31. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. See also Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S.
546 (1975) (municipal theater is a designated public forum); Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n., 429 U.S. 167 (1976) (school board meeting
qualifies as designated public forum); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (public university is a designated public forum).
32. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
33. Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1256. See, e.g., Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (considering prison nonpublic forum because protest speech seen as inconsistent with prison
purposes).
34. Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1258 (3d Cir. 1992).
35. See Jakab, supra note 3, at 550.
36. Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1256.
37. Travis v. Owego-Apalachin Sch. Dist., 927 F.2d 688, 692 (2d Cir. 1991).
38. Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1260.
39. Id. at 1256.
40. The emerging concept of the limited public forum was brought to the fore in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
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forum. 41 The court employed the factors of prior history, policy and
practice used in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Education
Fund4 2 to determine if the library was intended to be open to "assembly and debate as a public forum."'4 3 Relying most heavily on the
library rules, the court of appeals concluded that the library was
not intended to be an arena for all expression, just for the communication of the written word. 45 The process of so narrowly defining the
library's function enabled the court to pigeonhole the library into the
newly established category of a limited public forum.4 As such, the
library need only allow activity consistent with the written communication of ideas, which may be regulated subject to the four-part test.
In addition, unorthodox library behavior may be more freely restrained, subject only to the reasonableness test. 47
In the view of the court of appeals, Rules 1 and 548 of the library patron policy regulate conduct incompatible with the written
receipt of information, such as noisy and boisterous activity. 41 Thus
the court applied the reasonableness test and found Rules 1 and 5 to
be a reasonable means to prohibit disruptive behavior.50
In analyzing the library's Rule 9, which regulates permitted
conduct, both the district court and the court of appeals applied the
same stricter four-part test, yet achieved strikingly opposite results.
Both parties agreed that Rule 9, the so-called "hygiene test, '5 1 was
content neutral, thus eliminating the need for the courts to discuss
this prong. 52 The district court had held that the government could
only have a significant interest when the regulated behavior actually
Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1259.
473 U.S. 788 (1985).
43. Id. at 1258 (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802).
44. See supra note 14, for the text of the rules. It is curious that the court chose this
path since the rules themselves were at the center of the controversy and the Supreme Court
had already addressed the issue in Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966), which held that
while a library sit-in may have been unnerving, it did not exceed the appropriate limits of
misbehavior.
45. Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1260.
46. Id. at 1261.
47. This new category represents a fusion of the public and nonpublic forums by adopting a test from each category. The limited public forum serves as a type of compromise,
through which courts can analyze forums possessing qualities from each extreme.
48. See supra text accompanying note 14.
49. Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1262.
50. Id.
51. One scholar has warned of the danger of restricting speech on the basis of taste,
suggesting that the "legitimation of regulation on grounds of taste would reinforce those attitudes and thereby support one of the strongest causes of the intolerance of unorthodox ideas."
Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
449, 484 (1985).
52. Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1262.
41.

-42.
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disrupted the forum.5 The court relied on case law which had held
'
that behavior must cause "material and substantial disruption ""5
that rises above mere annoyance or disquietude. 5
Because the district court determined that a person's body odor
did not constitute an actual disruption," it held that the policy did
not "reasonably effectuate its stated goal of preserving the good order of the Library. 57 The court of appeals dismissed this reasoning
on two grounds. First, it dismissed the need for actual disruption by
determining that Tinker v. Des Moines School District58 and
Grayned v. City of Rockford,5" the cases primarily relied upon by
the district court, did not rest on such a holding.10 The court also
noted that several other library rules, such as the number of books
that can be borrowed, regulate non-disruptive behavior.61 Additionally, the court held that rule 9 does in fact regulate disruptive behavior since the odor must rise to the level of a nuisance before expulsion can occur.6 2 This finding allowed the court to determine that
a significant governmental interest was involved.63 This analysis is
crucial, as the outcome of a case often largely depends on how the
court determines what is significant." The court also determined
that the district court improperly applied the narrowly tailored test,
stating that the proper test is to see if library order would be
achieved less effectively without the rule.65 In light of this minimal
scrutiny, the court easily found Rule 9 sufficiently narrow.66
The final prong of the test requires that the individual who has
had his rights restricted at least retain alternative channels of com53. Kreimer, 765 F. Supp. at 188.
54. Id. at 191 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969)). See
also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1982) (validating anti-noise ordinance because state courts impose actual disruption standard).
55. See, e.g., Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (holding annoyance
statute invalid as an unascertainable standard).
56. Kreimer, 765 F. Supp. at 189.
57. Id.
58. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
59. 408 U.S. 104 (1982).
60. Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1263 n.25.
61. id.
62. Id. at 1624 n.28.
63. Id.
64. Langwortfiy, supra note 30, at 131.
65. Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242, 1264 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 4921 U.S. 781, 799 (1989) which held that municipal noise regulation
designed to ensure that music performances in band shell did not disturb surrounding residents, by requiring performers to use sound system provided by city, did not violate free
speech).
66. Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1264.
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munication.6 7 The district court reasoned that while many people
could receive information from other sources, or cleanse themselves
so as to comply with the rule, homeless people like Kreimer had
neither of these avenues open to them; therefore the lower court declared Rule 9 invalid.6 8 The magnitude of the right to receive information, and the importance of maintaining a means of access to information, lies in the fact that the right to receive information
elevates the chances of the poor and homeless to better themselves.6 9
Conceding this problem, 70 the court of appeals nonetheless stated
that this fact was irrelevant and that Mr. Kreimer's alternative
channel is to comply with the rule, in spite of the court's knowledge
that the avenue was clearly not available to him. 71 As if to bolster
this weak position the court quickly changed gears and applied a
balancing test, judging that the cumulative rights of the other patrons and staff outweighed Kreimer's First Amendment rights.72
The court of appeals then applied questionable reasoning in the
balancing test when it gave excessive weight to the rights of the patrons and staff. It is not a matter of one person's inclusion resulting
in the deprivation of the rights of others, since no one except
Kreimer was being forced to leave the library. It is rather Kreimer's
right to receive any information at all which should be weighed
against the incremental decrease in a patron's enjoyment of his or
her right. At most this hygiene rule affects a patron's right by making him or her change seats, while it completely eliminates Kreimer's
rights. 73 Analyzed in this framework, it is difficult to see how the
court reached its conclusion.
While the reversal of the district court on Rules 1 and 5 can be
attributed to the forum reclassification of the library, which led to
the application of a different standard, the reversal on Rule 9 analyzed under the same four-part test, provides insight into the current
status of First Amendment analysis. To begin with, while the courts
have tried to adopt a systematic review with the four-part test, there
still remains a great deal of fluidity and malleability in the stan67. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
68. Kreimer, 765 F. Supp. at 189.
69. For an in-depth discussion of this area, see generally Horning, supra note 20.
70. Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1264.
71. Id.at 1265.
72. See id. at 1265-66.
73. Perhaps Justice Brennan expressed this concern best: "Surely that minor inconvenience is a small price to pay for the continued preservation of so precious a liberty as freq
speech." Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 320-21 (1974) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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dards. Also, the continuing expansion of the categories suggests that
the use of public forum analysis is inadequate for determining First
Amendment issues.74 One scholar has suggested that instead of further confining First Amendment analysis by the creation of more
sub-categories, courts should attempt to formulate a more abstract
theory in order to accommodate the wide range of scenarios likely to
confront courts in the future.75 While public forum analysis continues to be widely used, its application has led to some interesting results. For example, a welfare department's waiting room has been
deemed a traditional public forum, 76 while certain sidewalks have
been grouped in the nonpublic forum category.77
While the popularity of public forum analysis remains high, the
outcome of Kreimer suggests that, as more and more public places
become categorized, the usefulness of the model will diminish. Lower
courts are already having to deal with conflicting precedent, demonstrating that the fixation on this model has distracted courts from
the real issue of First Amendment analysis: reconciling the exercise
of an individual's freedom of speech with the interests of society.
Drew Patrick Gannon

74.
75.
76.
77.

Jakab, supra note 3, at 551.
Jakab, supra note 3, at 550.
Albany Welfare Rights Org. v. Wyman, 493 F.2d 1319 (2d Cir. 1974).
U.S. v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990).

